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
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








MAP OF A PART OF TURKEY IN EUROPE.



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MILITARY REFLECTIONS

ON

TURKEY.

BY

BARON VON VALENTINI,

MAJOR GENERAL IN THE PRUSSIAN SERVICE.

*EXTRACTED AND TRANSLATED FROM THE GENERAL'S
TREATISE ON THE ART OF WAR.*

BY A MILITARY OFFICER.

WITH A MAP AND PLAN.

LONDON:

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PREFACE.

ALTHOUGH no apology may be necessary, at a moment when universal attention is directed towards Turkey, for presenting to the Public the following military reflections on that country, made by so distinguished a general as the Baron Von Valentini, still some seems required for the mutilation which has thus been made of the General's third volume of his Treatise on the Art of War, instead of a complete translation, which might be thought more desirable. That part of the volume which has not been translated, comprises a history of the Turkish campaigns from 1808 to 1811, which furnishes nothing new or instructive as regards the actual science of war; but presents, on the contrary, a succession of badly concerted operations, almost entirely aban-

done to the influence of chance. The most striking and interesting feature in the wars of the Turks, is the singularity of their movements, their tactics, and general military character ; of which a correct conception may be formed from the description given by the Baron, whose experience, derived from actual service in Turkey, has enabled him to note down and collect such facts relative to the national character and the peculiar features of the country, as are calculated to supply all the information we can require respecting the Ottomans in a military point of view ; and it is upon this experience and his perfect knowledge of the art of war, that the Baron has founded his proposed strategical dispositions for a future invasion and conquest of Turkey. This consideration has induced the Translator to omit the details of the last Turkish wars, which would certainly possess little or no attraction for the generality of readers, and which, besides, would have required several illustrative plates, and have thus

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considerably delayed the publication of the more interesting selection from the original work.

Though these pages are addressed more particularly to military men, it is presumed they will be found not devoid of interest in a political point of view. If the Author's views be correct, it is evident that the whole of Turkey in Europe, and of a considerable portion of Asia, may become an easy prey to Russia, provided adequate means be brought into the field, and her armies be conducted with energy and skill; but these same views also necessarily indicate both the weak and the strong points of the Turks, and consequently enable us to conclude, in some degree, upon the measures which it might become necessary to adopt for operating a diversion in favor of the latter, should a well-concerted policy of Western Europe require that the Sublime Porte be upheld and maintained as a barrier against any further extension towards the South, of the already overgrown Russian Empire.

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CHAPTER I.

THE TURKS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY.

Montecuculi's opinion of the Turks—Their operations subsequent to the battle of St. Gothard, in 1664—Peace considered by them merely as a truce—Their menacing attitude towards Western Europe, whilst they were in possession of Hungary—Their policy—Their decline at the close of the seventeenth century—Eugene of Savoy—Tactics of the Christian armies—Tactics of the Turks—The Turkish camps similar to those of the Romans—Peculiar character of the Turks.

It is worthy of remark, that Montecuculi, alike distinguished as a great general and a military writer, should present to us the Turks as models for imitation in war, as much on account of the wisdom with which they undertake it, as of the manner in which they conduct it; and that he should consider their marches, their encampments, and their dispositions for battle, equally worthy of commenda-

tion : nor did the victory of St. Gothard, which he gained in 1664, as generalissimo of the Christian army, shake the high opinion which he had previously formed of his enemies. Immediately after that battle, the Turks certainly executed a bold manœuvre, to which no subsequent part of their history offers any parallel. Though defeated, and repulsed with great loss beyond the Raab, they retired in good order, according to their fashion, along the right bank of this river, and from thence to Gran, where they passed the Danube, and, vigorously resuming the offensive, advanced towards the Waag, with the apparent design of penetrating into Moravia. In the meantime the Christian army, being greatly in want of provisions and reinforcements, had also retrograded as far as Edenburg, and had approached the Danube by moving on Altemburg. Upon receiving intelligence of the passage of the Turks at Gran, Montecuculi marched his army to Presburg, where he also crossed the Danube, and arrived upon the Waag before the enemy. The Vizir, astonished at finding the Christians already there, remarked, that “ they must surely have made a compact with friendly spirits, who revealed to them his projects.” He succeeded nevertheless in maintaining

himself upon this frontier of Hungary, and concluded an advantageous peace, by which he retained the fortress of Neuhausel, and several other places which he had captured.

A peace with the Turks is, in reality, nothing more than a truce concluded for a certain number of years; and, however futile this distinction may appear, at first sight, it possesses, nevertheless, a deep meaning. The followers of Mahomet are bound, in conformity to the precepts of that prophet and those of Osman, the founder of the Turkish Empire, to carry on a continual war with the nations which do not share in their belief. The *crescent*, a significant emblem, must extend itself over the whole terrestrial globe. All must acknowledge it, or submit to it. Hence the Turks have never denied, as Christian conquerors have done, that the possession of towns and provinces, which the fate of war had given them, was only a *point d'appui* for marching with greater security to new conquests; and it is to the religious observation of this national law that we must attribute their aggrandizement, as we must also their decline to the laxity of principles which took place at a later period.

The possession of Hungary opened to them

the road to western Europe, and brought them twice to the gates of Vienna. The ambitious aristocrats of Transylvania, and the disaffected of Hungary, did not disdain to act the part of auxiliaries and skirmishers to the Mussulmans. Fortunately, however, the German Princes, rallying themselves under the banners of Austria, and receiving timely assistance from John Sobiesky, at the head of 40,000 Poles, fighting after the manner of the Turks, checked this irruption, and thus saved us from experiencing the fate of the Greeks and the Wallachians.

At that period it was a part of the political system of the Turks to fight their enemies separately, and to make peace with one as soon as they found in it the means of obtaining some advantage over another. It was in this manner that they took advantage of the twenty years' truce with Austria, after the victory of Montecuculi, to take possession of Candia from the Venetians, and to enter afterwards into a new war against Poland and Russia, which procured for them the conquest of Kaminietz, in Podolia, and of a part of Ukraine.

The next war with Austria, which they commenced at the instigation of France, and, contrary to their custom, before the entire expiration of the truce, was opened with the siege of

Vienna. It lasted sixteen years, and terminated in 1699, with the treaty of Carlowitz, which deprived them of Hungary, Sclavonia, and Transylvania. They were also obliged to restore the countries conquered from the Venetians and Poles, and to deliver up Azov to the Russians. We find them, therefore, at the close of the century, driven back within almost the same limits which confine them at the present day, and rendered scarcely any longer formidable to Christianity, which only continued, through form, to pray in its churches for safety from their attacks. Among all the great captains of Austria, it is principally to Eugene of Savoy, a hero whose name has remained so popular, that we are indebted for the decline of the crescent, which only the jealousies and rivalries of the Christian powers still support upon the horizon of Europe.

It is only by reflecting on the tactics of the Christian armies, and on the manner of fighting peculiar to the Turks, that we can conceive how it happened, in the battles of that period, that the existence of the former was always compromised, and that the savage bravery of the Ottomans, failing in almost every attack upon the disciplined masses of the Christians, was not less frequently crowned with victory. The

annihilation of the defeated army, and the death, or capture, of the general, were invariably the result of a battle*.

The Turks, who were at that time continually at war, did not experience the same difficulty as at present, in entering upon a campaign with armies of a hundred thousand men and upwards. Their artillery was always numerous. The Christians counted by hundreds the pieces which they took from them in their victories. They had, besides, for auxiliaries, the hordes of Tartars and Scythians from the Black Sea, who are now become our allies, under the denomination of Cossacks. The Austrians, who could not, as has been al-

* In the campaign of 1695, a bloody action took place at Lugo, near Temeswar, in which the Austrian Field-Marshal Veterani, perished in a marsh, after witnessing the destruction of the whole of his corps d'armée by the Turks, who were commanded by the Sultan Mustapha, in person. This place still retains the name of *Veterani's Tomb*, as does also the cavern, well known in more recent wars, by the Danube, between Belgrade and Widdin, from which the navigation of the river can be checked, and which was planned by this general, and named after him.

Some years before, a general, Heister, had also experienced a complete defeat, in Transylvania; but having been made prisoner with part of his troops, his life was saved. He had been opposed to the insurgents, headed by Tekely, who were naturally more merciful than the Turks.

ready mentioned, reckon upon their Hungarian light troops, found it almost impossible to send out skirmishers, patrols, or foragers. They only felt themselves secure when in their closed ranks of six deep, two of which were armed with pikes. They surrounded themselves moreover, with chevaux-de-frise, a means of defence which the Russians have also employed in more recent wars. We find, in the order of battle adopted by the Christians, the cavalry mingled with the infantry; for instance, a battalion alternately with four squadrons; a singular disposition, but which was superinduced by the impetuosity of the Turks, and by their superiority in the *mêlée*. According to the method of that time the cavalry were trained to give fire, and the dragoons often fought on foot. Montecuculi, at the battle of St. Gothard, placed platoons of thirty musketeers upon the wings of his squadrons, and profited by this disposition. The great object was to maintain, by means of platoons or divisions, an uninterrupted fire against the Janissaries, who boldly advanced from all quarters in close masses, and attempted to break open the chevaux-de-frise with hatchets. Prince Louis of Baden, under whom the great Eugene was formed, conceived the idea (considered brilliant at that time) of

selecting from his battalions, riflemen, whose business it was to amuse the enemy until the moment of attack. In the order of battle of the army, the two lines were generally closed upon the flanks by other troops in column, which presented the form of an oblong square. The generals recommended that this order should never be broken, not even for the purpose of pursuing the enemy, after having repelled his charge; for the Turks were cunning enough to make several false attacks, and to place considerable corps of reserve, one behind the other, which, suddenly checking the imprudent pursuit of the Christians, might drive them back, and penetrate into the openings of their lines. In this service, therefore, only the light cavalry could be employed, which, placed in reserve between the lines, then advanced and drove back to some distance the disordered crowd of Turks, whilst the lines, solid as walls, only gained ground in mass, and were always prepared to receive their cavalry, and to repel the attack of that of the Turks, which returns to the charge as rapidly as it is dispersed.

The presenting of a front, or the regular deployment of troops, was as little practised among the Turks of that period as among those of the present day: they constantly brought

forward contiguous swarms, which often entirely surrounded the great square of the Christians ; a mode of fighting which perhaps naturally resulted from their superiority in point of numbers, and from the general ardor with which this furious multitude rushed to the attack.

It may be easily conceived that the Christian army was under the necessity of having its baggage constantly with it ; that is, of placing it between columns when on the march, or between the lines when encamped ; for, in such wars, it was indispensably necessary that it should at all times be provided with ammunition and supplies of every kind. The least digression would have exposed it to the risk of falling into the hands of the enemy's scouring parties,

The Turks placed every thing which they had carried along with them, in the middle of the camp, which they always fortified. Wealth and luxury held their sway among them at that time more than at present, and yet they fought better, notwithstanding their magnificence and refinement^b. The aspect of their camps readily

^b It would almost seem that the desire of taking riches and valuables into the field, is peculiar to military despotism. Buonaparte, in his last campaign, had his treasures and state-jewels with him, under the impression that they were not secure elsewhere.

recalls to mind the Romans, who were also in the habit of intrenching themselves. But this resemblance cannot be attributed to imitation or to tradition; for it may be confidently asserted that Ali Pacha of Janina is the only Turk who knows any thing about the Romans^c. In the time of Montecuculi, the Turks had not yet adopted this practice of fortification, which only commenced with them in the next century, when they already began to lose the advantage of a continual *offensive*. It is possible that the engineers of Louis the Fourteenth introduced among them something of European tactics, of which, however, in other respects, no vestige is to be found at present. In general, they are by no means imitators, and this is, perhaps, their greatest wisdom^d. An enlightened sovereign, far from attempting to introduce among them any thing of European practice, would rather seek to develop those peculiar qualities of which the germ evidently exists in these extraordinary people^e; and they might then again

^c He even calls himself the successor of Pyrrhus, because he rules over Epirus, which, however, only forms a small part of his territories.

^d They have a proverbial expression, which is literally, "We are what we are."

^e The Prince de Ligne observes, "to what would the Eu-

become formidable, if not to the whole of Europe, at least to the neighboring states.

ropean nations be reduced, if a soap-boiler were made a minister of state; a gardener, high admiral; and a servant, commander-in-chief?" The whole of the description of the national character, in his eleventh Letter upon the campaign from 1787 to 1789, is worth reading.

CHAPTER II.

THE TURKS IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY.

Mode of fighting peculiar to the Turks—Their light infantry—Their light cavalry—Numerical force of the Christian armies—Diseases to which an army in Turkey is subject—Their causes—Means of preventing them—Russia the most formidable enemy of the Turks—The Cossacks—Tactics of the Russians against the Turks—Battle of the Kugul, in 1769—Battle of Chumla, in 1774—Tactics suitable to be employed against the Turks—Protection and arrangement of the baggage—French order of battle in Egypt—Dispositions for protecting the cavalry against the onset of the Turks, and for covering its attack upon the latter—Application of these dispositions to a corps d'armée—Austrian order of battle against the Turks—The Duke of Saxe-Coburg—Battles fought by the French in Egypt and Syria: the Arabs and Mamelucks—Inferiority of the Christian cavalry: employment of the lance recommended.—Proposed offensive order of battle for the Christian cavalry—Sketch of the theatre of war: Moldavia, Wallachia, Besarabia, and Bulgaria—Gun-boats on the Danube—Importance of this river in the operations.

THE wars with the Turks recall to our recollection, more than any other, those of the an-

cients; whether we consider the theatre upon which they are carried on, or the mode of encamping and fighting by which they are characterized. The battles resemble those described by Polybius; for the Turks, like the Romans, never fight otherwise than in front of their camp. In the time of their prosperity, they always advanced towards the enemy with all their force; they observe the same rule now with respect to their cavalry. When we have succeeded in beating back their confused swarms, which generally happens, we march to the attack of their camp, and endeavor to destroy them, in the same manner as we would a troop of wild boars after having driven them back to their lair.

Formerly, the total want of light infantry in the unwieldy European armies must have given a great advantage to the Turks. In all the accounts of that, and even of a more recent period, the Janissaries are extolled as the first light infantry in the world. They could not, however, have been very efficient at that time; as we may easily infer from their having been formidable only in intersected ground, and from the European cavalry never having feared them in the plain.

The Turkish light cavalry have sustained

their reputation to a more recent epoch. The being on horseback is quite a national habit. Travellers relate that in the East, when proceeding from place to place on horseback, the Turkish guide ascends and descends the mountains at a gallop, over bushes and rocks, and puts to shame the European horseman, who fears to follow him.

The same boldness is to be found in the masses. "The Turkish cavalry" says an experienced witness, "disperses itself in the mountains amid rocks and bushes, and then debouches unawares by the most narrow paths, without fearing any disorder, since it is not accustomed to be in order. Hence it is extremely dangerous in an intersected country; it passes through places which seem impracticable, and suddenly appears upon the flank or rear of the enemy. Two or three men advance, and look about them: then you will see all at once five or six hundred, and woe to the battalion which marches without precaution, or which is seized with a panic." This, however, only relates to the flower of the Turkish cavalry, known under the name of Spahis: there is a vast number of Asiatic rabble on horseback, to which this description does not at all apply.

But what proves more than any thing the warlike disposition of the Turk, is, that he is a foot-soldier or a dragoon, according to circumstances. If the Spahi loses his horse, he immediately takes his place among the infantry; and, in the same manner, the Janissary will mount, without hesitation, the first horse which chance throws in his way.

It is worthy of remark, as accounting for the success of the Christian powers, that in the wars of the eighteenth century against the Turks, there was a much smaller disproportion in the numerical force of the troops, than in the preceding ones. The weakness of the Christian armies was Montecuculi's principal subject of complaint, who, however, modestly demanded no more than 50,000 men (half infantry, and half cavalry ^a) to make head against a Turkish army, frequently double that number. The Turks still preserved this superiority in the campaigns of Prince Eugene; who, however, was enabled, by the increase given to the standing armies, to bring into the field 100,000 men; but this number rapidly diminished, more from their being unaccustomed

^a This proportion, which has been long discontinued, was conformable to the tactics of that period.

to the country and the climate, than from any other cause; and even in modern times, the Christian armies have rarely exceeded the number of 30,000 combatants at the moment in which they came into action with the Turks.

The extraordinary ravages which disease makes in our armies in Turkey, deserve particular attention. If we are fortunate enough not to be attacked by the plague in the countries of the Lower Danube, we cannot escape other evils. The heat of the climate, the burning aridity of the day, the dew and the coolness of the nights, besides the privation of wholesome water, the springs failing, and the rivulets almost dried up; all these causes combined produce dysentery, intermittent and putrid fever, and fill the hospitals with crowds of sick, who quickly perish. The losses which the Austrian army, in its last war against the Turks, experienced, through these diseases, are incredible. The Russian troops likewise have always suffered more from this scourge, than from the arms of the enemy, but never in the same proportion as the Germans; and this difference, which has been remarked, may bring to light the true cause of the evil. The Russian soldier's mode of living, his usual food

consisting of salted viands, which he prefers ^b, and the custom of taking no other nourishment than vegetables and fish, during a certain season, (the Greek Lent,) tend to mitigate the effects of putridity. The great use of meat is very pernicious in this country; whilst, on the contrary, the pretended unwholesomeness of fruit is a prejudice, founded solely on the effects of eating it immoderately, and in an unripe state. It must be also observed, that in time of war (when finery must give place to utility) the Russian soldier is always clothed in a manner which is convenient to him, and protects him from the effects of the climate. His cloak, which he wears, or carries rolled up, at pleasure, affords him a sufficient covering. As to the tents, of which use is still made, the Cossacks know how to substitute for them their *burks*, (cloaks of goats' hair or felt,) which they carry under their saddles, and which they extend upon their pikes when forming an encampment. The remainder of their baggage serves them as bedding, and as a substitute for straw, to the want of which in this country may

^b The Russian soldier also eats a great deal of sourkrout, and of a mess called *tschtschi*, which is prepared with radishes, cabbages, unripe fruit, and other vegetables.

be attributed another cause for the maladies it entails upon the troops. The Cossacks, too, being more inured to the climate, and to the mode of living in war, are those who suffer the least of all from the evils arising out of it. These indications, which are not out of place in a military work of this kind, may induce some skilful physician to study the subject, and to propose a suitable mode of provisioning, maintaining, and clothing the soldier in a future war in Turkey.

One thing, however, is highly essential, and should be laid down as a maxim; namely, to avoid long encampments as much as forced marches; and, when the former become indispensable, as, for instance, in sieges, to maintain the soldiers in a suitable activity by means of useful works, for which the attacks furnish good opportunities. All the sieges which have been undertaken, at a more recent period, against Turkish fortresses, have been distin-

For instance, a daily ration of vinegar might be given to the soldier, and advantage taken of the recent invention of reducing vegetables into a small portable substance, preserving at the same time their nutritious qualities. The tents might also be provided with large coverings of fur, or felt, like those which the Tartars carry with them, to be laid on the ground underneath them.

guished as being dilatory beyond measure, owing entirely to the errors committed by the generals in command.

The French have found by experience in Egypt, that a moderate employment of both the physical and moral force, conduces to the preservation of health. When the plague broke out in their army, the engineers and the artillery, being continually occupied in the construction of entrenchments, or in the workshops, were tolerably free from it, whilst those who, being left in a state of inactivity and repose, abandoned themselves to the fear of the disease, became its first victims.

We may naturally infer, that the Roman legions, which, though certainly more accustomed to this destructive climate, were always encamped, without ever experiencing putrid fever or dysentery, owed their preservation to their constant activity and labour. They were incessantly employed in raising fortifications, in constructing roads and bridges, and in building their aqueducts, which carried fresh spring-water across the vallies from distant sources^d.

^d It would indeed be worth while to investigate more minutely the mode of living observed by the legions, with a view to preserve our armies from the diseases which at pre-

I am not at all of opinion, however, that the exercise with the musket should be resorted to, merely from the absence of other occupation in our camps. The soldier must have some fixed object before him, if required to overcome that laziness of disposition which is natural to man, and more particularly so in hot climates.

Russia is the most formidable enemy of the Turks, not only from her actual superiority, but from the opinion generally entertained among that people. In conformity with an ancient prophecy, the Turks consider it as doomed by their immutable destiny, that they will be driven out of Europe by a neighbouring people, whom they believe to be the Russians, and whose sovereign will enter their capital in triumph. The idea of returning, at some future period, to Asia, whence they came, is tolerably familiar to the most enlightened among them; and they even appear to consider their establishment in Europe, as nothing more than an

sent accompany them. It would not appear, at least not in their later times, that a greater moderation was the cause. The soldiers of the rebellious legions of Germanicus, of whom Tacitus relates that they opened their mouths to their generals, in order to shew how many teeth they had lost, were doubtless great eaters.

encampment. We may therefore easily conceive, that they do not enter the field against Russia, with that joyful ardour which is inspired by a presentiment of victory.

The great disadvantage of their relative position with Russia, appears from the fact, that since the time of Peter the Great, they have never been the aggressors in any war with that power. Even admitting that, when instigated by Charles XII., who had taken refuge among them, they commenced the celebrated campaign of the Pruth, which ended so disastrously for the Russians, we must recollect that the settlements of the latter upon the Black Sea, and their intercourse with the Cossack hordes, had already given sufficient provocation. The subsequent war, from 1736 to 1739, in which Field Marshal Münnich bore a distinguished part, brought these light troops completely under the banners of Russia, and thus added to the preponderance which she had already gained over the Turks in point of tactics and discipline. Nor did the Cossacks lose by the change; they having imbibed as much as was really useful to them, without losing anything of their peculiar character. The Spahis are not at all to be compared with them in the look-out, in cunningness, or in patience; and

although the proud Turkish horse looks like a Bucephalus, by the side of their modest backs, yet, notwithstanding this advantage, they know how to avoid, with great dexterity, the impetuosity of his attack. The talent which the Cossacks possess for exploring a country, and for finding their way every where, is more useful to the Russian army in a war in Turkey than in any other. In waste and deserted countries the Cossacks, forming scouring parties in advance, supply, in a great measure, with their natural penetration, the defect which still exists in regard to correct maps of this part of the world. No movement of the enemy can be concealed from them; no scout can escape them; and every thing which the country, forming the seat of war, yields in the way of provision, they collect for the subsistence of the army. That which happened to the Russians in their campaign on the Pruth, surrounded and starved as they were by clouds of light cavalry, would also be the fate, at the present day, of every Turkish army which might venture to oppose them in any thing like an open plain.

But it is more especially the improvement that has taken place in the tactics of the Russians, which must now render them more

formidable to the Turks. It was they who first changed the order of battle (already alluded to) of the Christian armies, consisting of one single large square, into a more suitable one of several smaller squares, but the strength of which, still amounting to twelve battalions, was not sufficiently available. The army, however, being in this manner rendered more disposable, advanced with these squares, which the Spaniards were unable seriously to molest in their progress, and drove back the Turks to their camp, as before described, and cannonaded them on all sides at once. At the battle of the Kugul, in 1769, so well described by Berenhorst, the Russians had five squares, one of which was placed exactly upon the prolongation of the enemy's camp, with a considerable battery, which produced so terrible an effect, that the Turks fled from their entrenchments. In the meantime, 1500 Janissaries attacked another square of twelve battalions, and had succeeded in routing one of its sides, when the necessary support arrived. Field Marshal Romanzow, the hero of this war, saw the evil of this disposition, and reduced the squares into smaller ones of from four to six (generally weak) battalions, which were supported, according to circumstances, by still smaller ones, even to

the ordinary square of a battalion. At the affair of Shumla, on the 30th of August 1774, he advanced, at once, from his camp, in similar squares, and marched a distance of two leagues in this order. When the Turks came forward to meet them, the squares, which had hitherto followed one another in column, formed into line. Five battalions of grenadiers, and two of light infantry, were distributed upon the wings, and formed so many separate small squares. The attack was made, in this order, upon the enemy, and he was driven back to his celebrated entrenched camp.

At the present day, however, the advance to the attack is no longer made in squares, immediately upon leaving the camp, but more conveniently in ordinary columns of march, which, upon the approach of the enemy, form squares in the twinkling of an eye. The formation of the square of one regiment, that is, of three battalions, appears to be the most natural and most suitable to our tactics. The first battalion is formed six deep; the second divides itself, and forms the right and left flanks; and the third, also six deep, forms the rear side of the square. In this manner, a tolerably equilateral square is produced, with an inner space of sufficient extent to contain the mounted of-


fficers, the bat-horses, the ammunition and such other waggons as the regiment cannot dispense with.

There are various modes of forming both large and small squares, which, under different circumstances, may be equally suitable. But, with respect to the Turks, we ought to reject, more than when employed against any other enemy, all refinement in tactics ; and adopt not only the most simple and the most natural, but always one and the same mode of formation, in order that, at the moment of danger, the soldier may execute it mechanically, and not be kept in a state of suspense and uncertainty in regard to the word of command, by which whole regiments might be compromised.

The number of carriages in these squares must be limited to that which is indispensably necessary for the moment. When, at any time, in marching by route, the number is found to be so great as to throw an impediment in the way of a regular movement, should such be required, recourse must be had to large squares; and, in this case, the oblong figure is the most suitable*. The French, in Egypt, formed their

* The arrangement of this unavoidable accompaniment of baggage-waggons deserves particular attention. Large carts with long teams are the most cumbersome and embarrassing,

squares of whole divisions, and placed their materiel, and their most feeble cavalry, in the extensive inner space, being unable to protect them in any other manner from the numerous swarms of Arabs and Mamelucks. Three divisions, attacked when on the march, placed themselves in the following order of battle;




in which the artillery were posted at the angles, and ought not to be tolerated in a campaign in Turkey. Two-wheeled carts, such as those in which the Russians carry their ammunition, tents, and other requisites, are the most useful. They can be drawn by a single shaft-horse, which may, if required, be assisted by a second horse, attached to its side, in reserve. As an example of four-wheeled carts, (of which it is necessary to have a few,) I would recommend the Russian *kibitke*, which is easily drawn by two or three horses abreast. Upon the same principle, we should endeavor, as much as possible, to place the horses of the artillery abreast, and this can be done without inconvenience upon the heaths which constitute the greater part of the Turkish theatre of war.

and immediately before the front, and the horses and limbers, together with every thing incapable of defence, were sheltered within the square.

It is evident that these squares of divisions, or of regiments, required to have light infantry in advance, in order to explore the villages, bushes, or other posts in front of them, which might be disputed by the enemy. The French employed in this service their tirailleurs and carabineers, of which there is one company in every battalion, and which were formed into small columns of attack. According to our system, the tirailleurs of the third rank would be employed, and if attacked by cavalry, would form themselves in small groups at the corners of the large squares, or place themselves with the artillery, in order to assist it in the defence of the long sides. I would recommend to the officers of this light infantry, for their better security, that they should remain on foot.

Since the only superiority which the Turks may still retain over us in the field consists in the use of the sword, it is natural enough that they should always seek out our cavalry, and charge it in preference to our batteries and squares. The cavalry should, therefore, never


be left exposed, entirely by itself, to such an attack, but always have its front and flanks protected by the fire from the batteries and squares; and their main body should be constantly kept in close order of battle, so as to form a mass upon which the skirmishers in advance may fall back when necessary. The following orders of battle, which were also practised by the French in Egypt, are suitable for this purpose :



The cavalry is here placed in a column of considerable breadth, between two large squares, and is also provided, at its exterior angles, with artillery for its own immediate defence.


The next order of battle is applicable when the cavalry is proportionably stronger, so that, when placed between the three smaller squares which protect its front and flanks, it may advance to attack the enemy. The batteries upon the angles of the cavalry, should then join the nearest squares.

arrange as follows:—




Every column of baggage, which marches separately from the rest of the army, should be protected in a similar manner by squares of battalions.

If we apply these orders of battle to a *corps d'armée* of four divisions (that is, of thirty-six battalions, thirty-six squadrons, and twelve batteries), the two divisions which we will suppose to constitute the main body, (disposing of the other two as the advanced guard and reserve), will be arranged in the following order :




Each division forms three squares, as shown

be left exposed, entirely by itself, to such an attack, but always have its front and flanks protected by the fire from the batteries and squares; and their main body should be constantly kept in close order of battle; so as to form a mass upon which the skirmishers in advance may fall back when necessary. The following orders of battle, which were also practised by the French in Egypt, are suitable for this purpose :




The cavalry is here placed in a column of considerable breadth, between two large squares, and is also provided, at its exterior angles, with artillery for its own immediate defence.

The next order of battle is applicable when the cavalry is proportionably stronger, so that, when placed between the three smaller squares which protect its front and flanks, it may advance to attack the enemy. The batteries upon the angles of the cavalry, should then join the nearest squares.




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Each division forms three squares, as shown


be left exposed, entirely by itself, to such an attack, but always have its front and flanks protected by the fire from the batteries and squares; and their main body should be constantly kept in close order of battle; so as to form a mass upon which the skirmishers in advance may fall back when necessary. The following orders of battle, which were also practised by the French in Egypt, are suitable for this purpose :



The cavalry is here placed in a column of considerable breadth, between two large squares, and is also provided, at its exterior angles, with artillery for its own immediate defence.


The next order of battle is applicable when the cavalry is proportionably stronger, so that, when placed between the three smaller squares which protect its front and flanks, it may advance to attack the enemy. The batteries upon the angles of the cavalry, should then join the nearest squares.

Another order of battle, which was also practised by the French in Egypt, is as follows :



Every column of baggage, which marches separately from the rest of the army, should be protected in a similar manner by squares of battalions.

If we apply these orders of battle to a *corps d'armée* of four divisions (that is, of thirty-six battalions, thirty-six squadrons, and twelve batteries), the two divisions which we will suppose to constitute the main body, (disposing of the other two as the advanced guard and reserve), will be arranged in the following order :



Each division forms three squares, as shown

by the numbers I. and II. The cavalry of the division is distinguished by the letter D, and a brigade of three regiments, brought up from the reserve of cavalry, by the letter R. From the above, it is easy to comprehend the similar disposition of the reserve division, regard being had, however, to the reserve artillery and the park, which must be suitably covered by the squares; as also of the advanced guard, which pushes forward its fusileers in squares of battalions, and which must never allow a body of cavalry to be exposed without support, to the attack of the enemy.

It is also evident from the order of battle, that our ordinary mode of encamping and marching, can, with but few modifications, be retained in our operations against the Turks, as well as against any other enemy. Our divisions can, at pleasure, change their squares into columns of march, either to the front or to a flank, and as easily form line, or reform squares. In the disposition we have been describing, we have considered the squares as being formed six deep; and if we might trust, as the Russians do, the ordinary squares of three deep to the attack of the Turkish cavalry, the former would give us the advantage of presenting a greater front of fire. We may easily conceive how much would be gained by this order

of battle, and how completely the whole space between the squares and the masses of cavalry would be exposed to the fire of the musketry and of grape shot, by considering the encrease given to the space occupied by the squares, and the diminution of that comprised in the intervals, along the whole front of the formation.

It certainly does happen sometimes that an infuriated Turk, mounted upon a powerful horse, and perhaps intoxicated with opium, succeeds in overthrowing the three men of a file, and in penetrating into the square. But here the steadiness of the men, who know their enemy, renders his death certain. The only danger would be in the event of a great number of such venturous and fool-hardy fellows penetrating into the square; but the Turkish cavalry never attack with combined strength, and in conformity with a regular plan; and therefore the assertion, however extraordinary, is probably correct, that individual infuriated riders, as above described, have penetrated a square, through and through, without knowing where they were. After what has been already said, it would be superfluous, in treating upon

^y An instance of this occurred in November 1809, at the affair of Tartariga, near Silistria: the Turk was shot in the square.

Turkish warfare, to enter into the otherwise important discussion, whether the solid or the hollow square offers the greatest advantage. In every independent mass, the fronts which present the greatest fire are indisputably the most advantageous; a principle, the application of which admits of being modified only by the character of the troops, and the celerity of movement which it may be necessary to impart to them.

In an excellent system of military operations against the Turks², written for the use of the Austrian generals, we find almost the same order of battle given as that which we have been describing. According to it, the squares are formed of two battalions, which, since the Austrian battalions consist of six companies, are equal to three of ours. Upon the flank, and in rear of each squadron, a division of cavalry, (that is, two squadrons,) is posted. The distance from one battalion to another, prescribed by this system is from two hundred to two hundred and fifty paces when the squares are to advance in line. The army is

² Grundsätze der Höhern Kriegskunst und Beyspiele ihrer zweckmässigen Anwendung, für die Generale der österreichischen Armee. Wien, 1808.

posted in three lines, of which the third forms the reserve, and has the park of artillery immediately in front of it. The squares are not formed until the enemy approaches, when they are disposed, by means of the three primitive lines, *en échiquier*, so as to have an entire command of the intervals. The advanced guard, consisting of light battalions and cavalry, is pushed forward, though not so far as to incur the risk of being cut off, to the nearest favorable ground, and formed into squares and masses, ready to receive the enemy. In the application of this order of battle, it is particularly recommended never to await the attack, but always to anticipate the enemy, and thus force him to the defensive. Partial engagements should be avoided, because in these the Turks are superior; whereas they are quite ignorant of the art of fighting in mass, and with unity of object. This plainly shows how the exalted commander (author of the treatise alluded to) has profited by the experience of his unsuccessful predecessors in the Turkish wars, to warn others from falling into the same errors.

In 1789, the Austrians, under the Duke of Saxe-Coburg, were successful in their operations against the Turks. This general, after

having, the year previously, captured Choczim (or Chotin), defeated, in conjunction with Suwarow, a Turkish corps at Foktschan, and afterwards, at Martinestia, the principal army, under the Grand Vizier, by which single blow he conquered the whole of Moldavia and Wallachia, where the enemy did not venture to show himself again. Of all the military exploits of this brave prince, who passed his latter years in Coburg, there was none, on the recollection of which he dwelt with greater fondness than on this victory; and even in his old age, he would have willingly undertaken another campaign against the Turks; "for," said he, "when we have once completely beaten them, we are no longer troubled with them during the whole campaign"—words which serve better to characterize the Turks than any other description.

In the battles fought by the French, in Egypt and Syria, with the Turks, the latter do not differ from the sketch we have given of them. The only exception is to be found in the commencement of Bonaparte's campaign, when he was opposed only to Mamelucks and Arabs, of whom it would appear, the former were much more cool and obstinate in battle, and the latter more indefatigable and active

in the skirmish, than the Turkish cavalry. The Mamelucks often seriously attempted to penetrate the French squares. They charged them in close squadrons, and made use of all kinds of arms in their endeavour to effect an opening. It is said that some of them even attempted to gain their object by dint of backing their horses against the squares, which proves, at least, their obstinacy. There is, however, no account of their having succeeded. The method adopted by the French against these clouds of cavalry was to surround them with their great squares, and bring them within the cross fire of the latter, when the former would seek an outlet across the plain to the desert of Arabia, which was always their refuge. The French accounts reckon by thousands the numbers of this fugitive cavalry which fell upon such occasions; but, if we consider that the Arab and the Mameluck ride over a considerable extent of ground in a minute, and that the infantry and artillery cannot load and fire very often in the same space of time, we shall not be deceived by the gasconade evinced in such enumerations. Only the infantry, but of which the Mamelucks had very few, and which they left in the rear for the purpose of falling back upon them as occasion might

require, could be annihilated in a defeat, a result which is also experienced by the Turkish infantry under similar circumstances.

It cannot be denied that our cavalry is inferior in comparison with the rest of our army, when opposed to the Turks. Being completely dependent on the protection of the batteries and squares of battalions, we cannot expect those grand, bold, and decisive effects, which are otherwise peculiar to it. It is only when the enemy is in full retreat, or half-beaten, that it can abandon its defensive position, so little consonant to its nature. In earlier times, however, the sword and lance of the knight have proved formidable to the sabre of the Saracen; and even in our own, individual combat has begun to be practised with success. The Christian horseman, conscious of his power and dexterity in the use of his weapons, will courageously attack the Spahi, but will probably confide more in the lance than the sabre, which the latter wields with a degree of perfection which we can scarcely hope to attain.^b It

^b The superiority of the Turks in the use of the sabre is founded partly on the quality of the weapon itself, and partly on their what may be termed *national* dexterity in handling it. The Turkish sabre, which is wrought out of fine iron-wire, in the hand of one of our powerful labourers, would

is natural, however, that when our adversary possesses a decided superiority in any particular thing, we should oppose to him something else which might place us on a more equal footing with him; and in this respect, therefore, the well known saying of Montecuculi, that the pike is the queen of arms, seems particularly applicable.

In pictures we see the Spahis also armed


perhaps break to pieces like glass at the first blow. The Turk, on the contrary, who gives rather a *cut* than a blow, makes it penetrate through helmet, cuirass, &c. and separates in a moment the head of the limbs from the body. Hence we seldom hear of *slight* wounds in an action of cavalry with Turks. It is a well known fact in the Russian army, that a colonel, who was in front of his regiment, seeing the Spahis make an unexpected attack upon him, drew his sabre, and was going to command his men to do the same, when, at the first word *draw*, his head was severed from his body. The highly tempered Turkish sabres will fetch a price of from ten to a hundred ducats, even when they are not of fine metal. But, as Scanderbeg said, such a sabre only produces its effect when in the hand of him who knows how to use it. It is related that, at the storming of Ismael, a brave foreigner who served as a volunteer in the Russian army, and who was most actively engaged in the *mêlée*, broke in pieces several Turkish sabres, and constantly armed himself with a fresh one taken from the Turks who were slain. The substance from which these valuable sabres are wrought, is called *taban*, and they are proved to be genuine, when they admit of being written upon with a ducat or any other piece of fine gold.

with a short pointed weapon, which, according to ancient descriptions of their mode of fighting, must have been a javelin. In my own experience, I never saw any thing of the kind; and in no instance can this weapon be considered their principal arm¹. Perhaps they used it before the introduction of fire-arms became general among them. We often perceive pikes elevated among their troops, and bearing flags, upon which are represented the crescent, or a blood-red hand and a sabre: but these are not so much weapons as ensigns of war, under which the leaders of all ranks assemble their men, and conduct them to battle. In general, we find among this people many of the usages of our ancient feudal ban, or of the armies of the middle ages, whence we naturally meet with a great number of such colours or standards

¹ In the campaign of 1811, individual Turks, and even videttes, were often seen armed with a lance. We are told (in Pouquinvillè's Memoirs) that the famous Pechlivan-Baba-Pacha, had under his orders a Bulgarian race, the Kersals, or Chrysalids, inhabitants of the Hoemus, who, in the war with Russia, gained for him decided advantages over the Don-Cossacks, and whom he armed with the lances taken from the latter. But this only tends to confirm my assertion that the lance or pike is but little used among the Turks, but that they became impressed with its advantages, and have made trials of it.

among their troops. Every village, from which the *Aga* (a sort of Mayor) takes the field, may unfurl its particular standard. Hence it is that the capture of hundreds of such colours forms but an insignificant trophy; they are only of importance when horse-tails, the military distinctions of the pachas, are attached to them.

In order however to restore to our cavalry the due consciousness of their strength, in their charges against the Spahis, and to raise them from the subordinate part hitherto assigned to them in the order of battle, the following disposition appears to me the most suitable.



The twenty-four squadrons of cavalry of reserve, which we have in a corps d'armée, are arranged in two lines, each of ten squadrons. Each flank is closed by two squadrons, which march

in sections ready to be wheeled up. Two batteries and two battalions (of the lightest and most expert infantry) are placed on opposite angles of this great square of cavalry, and efficiently protect its flanks with musketry, and its front and rear with canister-shot. The squares with their batteries preserve this relative position with the cavalry, even when advancing against the enemy, except at the moment of the charge, by moving in the double-quick, which enables the infantry to keep up for a moderate distance. But the attack from a superior enemy is to be received in a fixed position, with ranks closed and lances lowered. He cannot hold out against the flanking fire from the squares and batteries; and the moment he gives way, the fourth sections of the first line advance to the pursuit, and the rest follow in a short trot to the support. (A support or reserve brought up in good order is an essential point in every cavalry engagement with the Turks.) If the enemy succeeds in repelling the sections of skirmishers in pursuit of him, the main body of our cavalry makes a halt; the squares and batteries, even should they be somewhat in the rear, gain time to resume their posts; and the second line directs its attention to the intervals of the first, in the event of rash adventurers from among the enemy leaders.

vouring to penetrate it in following the retreating skirmishers.

Upon a plain of moderate extent, flanked by intersected and covered ground, such as we frequently meet with in all countries situated at the foot of mountains, (as in Bulgaria), the following disposition can be employed with good effect. The light infantry (perhaps also light artillery) advance with security along the edge of the hollows or woods by which such narrow plains are bounded, and protect with their fire the front and flanks of the cavalry; which, thus supported, are enabled to clear the whole ground in front of them from the enemy's troops.

Previously to entering into a consideration of the Turkish wars of our own times, a concise description of the theatre on which they have been conducted, will be useful, and perhaps not uninteresting. Let us follow the course of a traveller, who, having set out from Hermannstadt, crosses the high mountains of Transylvania by the pass of Rothenthurm, and ascends, by the small town and convent of Argisch, upon the river of the same name, the counterfort crowned with vines, from whence is seen the heath-covered plain of Wallachia. A great many rivers and rivulets descend from the mountains to the Danube, all of them impetuous in their

course, the greater part fordable, but overflowing at every heavy rain. The communications, which are only maintained by means of bad bridges and fords, are therefore very uncertain, and the fat soil of the country renders the roads impassable in wet weather. The whole plain is covered with oak brush-wood, the haunt, in severe winters, of a great number of wolves from the mountains, and the remains of high woods of oak, with which the country formerly abounded, but which the inhabitants have gradually burnt, to give place to pasturage for their cattle. The rearing of cattle forms the principal means of subsistence in the country, as also in the adjacent provinces of Moldavia and Bessarabia. These possess a somewhat different character from that of Wallachia: the streams, issuing from the flatter districts of Podolia and Bukowina, flow more slowly towards the Danube, and form marshes at various parts of their course. Bessarabia is almost entirely composed of soft ravines, running in a direction from north to south, conveying but little water, and presenting to the eye the appearance of a perfect plain, consisting entirely of pasture, without even a bush; and the inhabitants, after the manner of the Tartars, lead a wandering life in tents, which they carry about with them.

The Wallachians, too, are half wanderers, for their villages, which consist of spacious, and, for the greater part, subterraneous hovels, change position from time to time, on account of the pasturage; and hence it is, that we cannot trust to the situation of a place indicated upon a map, excepting where a church or a convent has assembled about it a sufficient number of wooden houses and huts, to constitute a sort of town. In Mólavia (perhaps from its greater vicinity to European civilization) we begin to find more fixed habitations. Agriculture is but little attended to in either province, and is almost entirely limited to Turkish wheat (kukerutz), of which the inhabitants make their bread; but it is more than compensated by the immense quantities of hay produced from the most luxuriant meadows; and which also serve to supply, during the winter, even the cattle of Transylvania, which are brought here in droves at that season.

The greater part of the population of both principalities is concentrated in the two large cities of Bucharest and Jassy, where are to be found different varieties of the human race, and almost all European nations, and where evidently exists the point of junction of Europe and Asia. The greatest wealth reigns here

amid the most abject poverty ; for the suburbs consist of miserable wooden cabins and mud-huts, in which the people from the country, rendered desolate by the Turkish and half Christian hordes of brigands, have sought the protection of the capital, and thus added to her extent and to her population. This, however, is more particularly the case with Bucharest. Jassy being less exposed to the violence of the Turks, and more protected by the new acquisitions of Russia, is gradually becoming a civilized town. The nucleus of these towns is formed by the Greek churches and convents, by the palaces of the boyars (the nobility of the country, and sole proprietors of the land,) and by the great merchants' houses and bazars which have originated in the important overland commerce with the Levant. The natives of Wallachia and Moldavia^k are a robust description of people, and, setting aside the vexations of a bad government, enjoy a tolerable share of liberty. The whole burthen of the most cruel despotism falls upon the *Gipsies*, a tribe of the precise origin of which we are ignorant, and who are settled here as a caste

^k Pretended descendants of the Romans, though only from the period of the decline of their eastern empire.

of slaves subject to the Boyars. The price of one of these Gipsies is fixed at sixty florins, and should one of them be killed by his master, the latter pays, by way of punishment, a fine of eighty florins. Many of them, from whom their masters only exact a certain tribute, wander about, half naked, in hordes, and not unfrequently gain their livelihood by having recourse to highway robbery. But travellers, and the wealthy inhabitants of the country, are more in danger from the Arnauts, a sort of voluntary militia in Turkey in Europe, of whom it is doubtful whether they acknowledge Jesus Christ or Mahomet, and who serve the Pacha, or any body who will pay them, but at the same time will pillage on their own account. The Hospodars have a body-guard composed of these Arnauts; and even the Boyars have some of them in their service and in their retinue, partly for their safety, and partly for pomp. Though they differ but little from the Turks in point of clothing and appointments, and as little in manners and character, they far surpass them in warlike qualities, from their constant, though not at all times reputable, practice in arms. They form the nucleus of the forces with which the adventurers of our time would make war against

the Porte. But travellers and merchants who, setting out from Hermannstadt or Cronstadt, have to cross the mountains, cannot be secure from them, except by forming armed caravans. The Danube, which separates these provinces from Bulgaria, is, at its entrance into the Turkish territories, a very considerable stream, partly from the size of its islands, and partly from the rapidity of its current, which renders it difficult to establish upon it a bridge of boats for any length of time; and this, besides, would require very large vessels. The Turks and Russians were in the habit of building them from the materials afforded by the Bulgarian woods on the bank. Silistria and Turtukey, where the stream is only a thousand paces broad, are the most advantageous points for these bridges. It would, however, be very difficult to protect them at any point against an active enemy on the right bank, since the whole country of Bulgaria is higher than the provinces on the opposite side, and terminates near the Danube in a steep bank, from which the plain of Wallachia can be completely overlooked. This bank is composed of rocks and steep slopes of clay, the common soil of the country, and is intersected by deep hollows of a similar description. In this valley, so favoured

by nature, waste land is seen alternately with the most luxuriant vineyards, which require but little cultivation, and which extend for miles along the Bulgarian bank of the Danube, and the produce of which cannot, as indeed their appearance sufficiently attests, be entirely devastated^l. The high land of Bulgaria is less favoured. Intersected by deep glens, which are dry in summer, it suffers from the want of water fit for drinking; and it is only by a proper management of conduits^m, and ap-

^l The Russian army which besieged Rutschuk was encamped in the adjacent vineyards from the spring of the year until the end of autumn. At first they cooked the unripe grapes as a part of their food, and during the harvest they were unable to consume the superabundance of ripe grapes, so that a great part of them remained, at the end of the season, ungathered and rotting upon the vines. During an armistice, the Turks and the inhabitants of Rutschuk were permitted to go out and gather grapes; and they brought into the town large baskets full supported on poles, in the same manner as did Joshua and Caleb in the land of promise. The grapes, dried as raisins, form a considerable article of the commerce of the country.

^m Mahometan benevolence has established at different places, along the least frequented roads, fountains and convenient watering-places, for the thirsty traveller and for the caravans. The clear spring-water flows from a tube into an elegantly-formed basin of stone, or even of marble; and the adjacent ground is paved with flags, and disposed into a con-

appropriate distribution of ponds, that it can be rendered as habitable as it would be, were its fertility alone consulted.

In carrying on operations along the Danube, it is absolutely necessary that each of the belligerent parties should possess a flotilla of gun-boats. The Turks always equipped theirs in such of the fortified places upon the stream as they possessed. But the Russians, at the end of the year 1809, being in possession of all the fortified places from the mouth as far up as Silistra, were enabled to run in their boats from the Black Sea. In all the wars of Turkey, the Danube has been the most important line of operations, from the facility which it affords for the transport of supplies; and it is upon its banks, but more particularly upon the Bulgarian, that the greater part of the battles have been fought. Hence the possession of this line, as a base of operations, has always been the aim of both parties; and, in the last war, it was very nearly secured by the Russians. The advantages, which this would have procured for them in the further prosecution of their conquests, are sufficiently obvious.

venient place of rest. Such charity belongs to the good works of the Mahometan faith.

CHAPTER III.

OBSERVATIONS RELATIVE TO THE TURKS OF THE PRESENT DAY.

Degeneracy of the Turks—Their repugnance to a winter campaign—Difficulties attending the latter in Turkey—Defence of towns by the Turks—Turkish fortifications—Barbarous usages of the Turks—Manner in which the Turks carry on war—Count Kaminsky, commander-in-chief of the Russian army—Method pursued by the Turks when advancing along their lines of operation.

It is evident from a review of the last war between the Porte and Russia, that the Turks of the present day only differ from those we have described in the preceding chapter, in so far as they have retrograded still more than their predecessors; and that much of what we learn of their present contest with the Greek insurgents, and of what a not distant future seems to promise, may be attributed to this degeneracy.

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It is known that the Asiatic troops, which comprise the principal force of the Turks,

abandon the field in winter; but Warnery's assertion that they commence their march homewards so early as the month of July, is certainly an exaggeration. Even the Janissaries are by no means partial to winter campaigns, and, after having supported, for a time, the fatigues of war, long to return to their homes, where they follow different trades and occupations, and cannot therefore be said to be imbued with martial ardor. As to the cavalry, the nature of the country may in some degree excuse their returning home at the commencement of winter. The Albanians, the Macedonians, and the ancient Thracians,—children of the soil which gave warriors to Pyrrhus and Alexander—are the only troops which will still remain under arms, even during the most rigorous season, provided the horse-tail is planted by an energetic Pacha, such as old Ali of Janina.

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A winter campaign in this country, notwithstanding its being situated in the same latitude as the interior of Italy, is not so easy as those who are unacquainted with it might imagine. Though the cold is seldom of long duration, but is succeeded alternately by thaw and heavy rains, still, during short intervals, it even ex-

ceeds that of northern climates ; a circumstance to be ascribed to the vicinity of the two chains of mountains which form the valley of the Danube ; namely, the Carpathians of Transylvania, constantly covered with snow, and the Hæmus or Balkan. The villages are mostly without resources, and are in no way suited for cantonments. All the valleys and glens are either filled with snow or inundated, and all the roads are absolutely impracticable during the wet weather. It is obvious, therefore, that both men and horses must be exposed to hunger, since there is no subsistence to be found, nor can any be transported, except in the case of small detachments upon short expeditions, when recourse may be had to båt-horses.

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In general, the defence of towns is the only part of the art of war in which the Turks still maintain their ancient national bravery. Places, most imperfectly fortified, which European troops and engineers would have considered it impossible to defend for any length of time were often purchased by the Russians at a great loss of men and time. This may proceed in some degree from the tranquillity and inactivity of the Turk, who is unwilling to move, and who will remain for whole weeks in a cave,

abandoning himself to his inevitable destiny, indifferent to every thing which happens near him, or to what the morrow may bring forth. Panic terror, which has always so powerful an effect upon an undisciplined and impassioned multitude, is the only favorable chance which the besiegers have to expect; and will often cause a Turkish garrison to abandon the place, in a state of wild desperation, if a road be left open for its flight. It is even remarked by Berenhorst, that in such cases, the belief in predestination serves as a cloak for cowardice. We may, however, consider it as a general rule that the Turks will maintain the defence to the very last, and that the great strength of their garrisons, and their actual luxury in point of arms, will always render an assault one of great bloodshed and danger. Every Turk, when properly armed, carries with him, besides his musket, at least one pair of pistols, a sabre, and a long, and somewhat curved dagger or knife, (the inward curve having the sharp edge), called a *kinschal*, which he uses principally in cutting off heads. This weapon, which is about two feet long, is not unlike the Roman short sword, and at the brilliant era of the Ottomans, it may have been proved not less formidable in the *mêlée* than was the lat-

ter, with which the legions subdued the world. Hence it is very evident that, in scaling a rampart, the European soldier, with his musket and fixed bayonet, is placed under great disadvantage against an enemy so well armed both for attack and defence.

With regard to the art of fortification among the Turks, little can be said in its praise. They have no idea of a regular system either of bastions or of lines, of outworks and covered ways, nor of conforming the height of the works to the nature of the ground in front. When we find any thing of this kind in a Turkish fortress, we may be assured that it has been in the hands of some European power, by which it has been improved, or originally constructed. This is the case with Belgrade, Widdin, and the small fortress of Giurgevo opposite Rutschuk^a; which last place is a model of most of the Turkish fortresses. It is surrounded with a high parapet, and deep ditches. The small bastions which project here and there, are filled with a raised terreplein, frequently consisting of enormous gabions, and seem to be constructed merely as stations for the artillery.

^a To which may now be added Brailow, which has been almost entirely reconstructed by the Russians.

Along the crest of the parapet is a gallery of smaller gabions, between which the besieged fire completely under cover, but mount upon the parapet at the moment of an assault. There are also placed along the parapet, at certain distances from each other, small watch-towers provided with apertures, for the purpose of flanking its superior slope : they are peculiar to Turkish fortification. We find them also at Shumla, though differently applied. The Turks have constructed some of them at the bottom of the ditches, and occupy them with fusileers, who reach them through a subterraneous passage leading under the rampart. As a protection against projectiles, they excavate for themselves a place along the bottom of the interior slope of the rampart ; and they are in the habit of completely shutting up their gates with masonry or brick-work, or of protecting them with immense traverses. It is evident, therefore, that the Turks, instead of imitating the European art of fortification, prefer a method which they conceive to be more advantageous to them at the moment of coming to close quarters.

The commander of the garrison, Pacha or Aga, generally reasons more justly than many of our modern commandants. The moment he

surrenders, his reign is at an end. From an absolute master, he becomes a slave, and is placed upon an equality with those over whose lives and properties he hitherto possessed unlimited power. If he retires by voluntary capitulation, he dare not flatter himself with finding indulgent or equitable judges. The silken cord, or the kinschal, awaits him; for the Porte is accustomed to punish misfortune equally with incapacity. We need not therefore be surprised that he should rather fight for his life and treasures.

Of all the Turkish Satraps, no one was influenced more powerfully by these considerations, than Bosniak-Aga, at Rutschuk. He succeeded his friend Mustapha Bairaktar in the command of this place, who, as Grand Vizier, heroically sacrificed himself, upon failing in his endeavors to subdue the rebellious Janissaries^b. His friend's chosen system of government having thus terminated with his life, Bosniak-Aga became a rebel to the Porte: When, however, the Russians made their appearance before him, he entered into a conciliatory negotiation with the Grand Vizier,

^b He blew himself up on the 14th of November, 1808, that he might not fall into the hands of the insurgents.

having been well aware that internal feuds must insure the triumph of the common enemy. In consequence of his brave defence, the Russians failed entirely in the campaign which they opened in the spring of 1810 by crossing the Danube, first at Ostrowa (below Widdin), and afterwards at Hirsowa and Turtukey.

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I may here make a few remarks upon the barbarous usages of the Turks. When they make prisoners, they do so only as an exception to a general rule. Their war against the infidels, whom they look upon as reprobates, assumes the character of one of extermination. They cut off the heads of the dead as well as of the living, and collect them in the same manner as the heads, claws, or snouts of noxious wild beasts are delivered to the authorities appointed to reward the slayers. The custom, which has been questioned by modern historians, of collecting the noses and tips of the ears of their enemies, is literally true. When, after a successful affair, the quantity of heads becomes too considerable for conveyance, those smaller salted parts are forwarded in sacks, as testimonials of their good fortune. The Porte awards payment for these trophies of extirpation, but prefers receiving entire heads, in order that

they may be fixed on poles in the capital, with all suitable éclat.

That the novice in a war with the Turks should feel some repugnance to this barbarous custom, is natural enough; but instead of willfully placing the harrowing picture before him, we should rather endeavor to impress upon him the philosophic opinion of the Prince de Ligne, who remarks that the cutting off the head does no harm to the dead, that it is often an act of mercy to the wounded, and that it is always very useful to the coward, since it places him in the necessity of defending himself. This last consideration does, indeed, produce a great effect in the most decisive moments, if we do but preserve our presence of mind. To keep our ranks compact and steady, and to be provident of our fire, like the huntsman who awaits the wild boar, is our only safety against a charge of Turkish cavalry. Here is no quarter, no grace, such as we occasionally meet with from Christian cavalry, as the Russian soldier, who is most familiar with Turkish warfare, well knows. He is invincible in his three-deep square; at least, in our own

^e Letters written during the Turkish campaign from 1787 to 1789.

What is said by an experienced officer, who was for a long time employed against the Turks, of their attacks and of the composition of their army, seems to be well founded. Foremost in the fight come the brave and the infuriated, who, without any reflection, rush upon the enemy: then follow the prudent, who first see how the affair is likely to turn out; and lastly, the rabble, who do nothing but plunder the dead and cut off heads after a victory, but who, in case of a defeat, are the first to take flight.

With regard to their famous Janissaries, and their infantry in general, I cannot comprehend why the Prince de Ligne, with all his experience in the last Austro-Russian war against the Turks, should extol their agility and expertness in the fight of corps to corps. It is only when the Turk is well nestled anywhere, that he becomes a good foot-soldier. Besides, it may be easily conceived that his number of weapons, his long and loose garments, and more particularly his enormously wide trowsers, which he is obliged to hold when running, render him incapable of making any rapid movement. Whenever we saw this infantry in flight, it appeared half naked, having disengaged itself of every thing which it could possibly throw away.

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The remark has been made, that great generals who have been victorious over the Turks, have not maintained their reputation when called upon to act against other nations, and really no exception could be made but in favor of Montecuculi and Eugene of Savoy. But perhaps the reverse of this is equally true. Whoever attempts to employ against the Turks that which he has acquired in the course of systematic warfare, without taking into consideration the peculiar character of their troops, will be sometimes too cautious, sometimes too daring, sometimes too quick, and sometimes too slow; and this seems to have been the case with the Russian commander-in-chief, Count Kaminsky.

In the war of 1806 and 1807 he had acquired considerable fame as a young general; and, in 1808, had distinguished himself as commander-in-chief in Finland, by the boldness and good fortune with which he had achieved the conquest of that country. When, therefore, in the flower of his age, he was placed in the independent command of a large army, he was looked upon as worthy to be the future opponent of Napoleon. It is not my purpose to

* It was even said that Buonaparte, or his faithful servants, conveyed poison to Count Kaminsky during his winter

discuss whether he might have attained this proud distinction ; but, with regard to the part he was here called upon to fill, he was deficient in many essential qualifications. He was unable to seize the proper moment for the execution of a bold enterprise, or for making concessions in negotiations ; but, above all, he wanted the necessary perseverance for overcoming difficulties, and was therefore ill-suited to terminate a war, which, though more tedious than any other, is attended with certain success, provided no weariness of fighting, or of maintaining the field, is permitted to take place.

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The manner in which the Turks carry on their operations, in conformity with their cautious system, is as follows : they select upon the road, along which they wish to advance, an advantageous post, and entrench themselves ; then they call in reinforcements, and wait to be attacked. If they are not attacked, they advance again, after a lapse of time, to another favorable post, which they never fail to entrench, even though they should only occupy it for one night. But they remain for

quarters in Bucharest, 1810-1811. Of this sin, however, the deceased prisoner of St. Helena was perfectly innocent.

days, and even weeks, in deliberation whether to advance further. If, however, time is allowed them, they are sure to approach so near, and place themselves in such a manner, as to offer considerable annoyance, and we are finally compelled to attack them in their own entrenchments.

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CHAPTER IV.

PROPOSED STRATEGICAL DISPOSITIONS FOR THE INVASION AND CONQUEST OF TURKEY.

Mount Hæmus, or the Balkan—Shumla—Road from Shumla to Constantinople—Plan of operations for crossing the Balkan—Road to Adrianople by Tirnova—The season proper for this invasion—Continuation of the operations—Adrianople—Measures to be adopted for securing a firm footing in that part of the country which has been conquered—Numerical force requisite for such an invasion—Preservation of the communications—Observations on the campaigns of 1789 and 1688—Road to Adrianople by Nissa, Sophia, and Philippopoli—Remarks on the campaign of 1810—Plan of operations for effectually expelling the Turks from Europe—Landing in Asia Minor, in co-operation with the attack upon Constantinople—Capture of Scutari—Siege of Constantinople—Advantages which its localities offer to the besieged—Army of observation in Asia Minor—Capitulation of Constantinople—The Turks driven back into Asia, as far as Caramania—Supposed case in which other powers co-operate with Russia—Landing at Smyrna—Complete conquest of Asia Minor—Destruction of the North African Pirates—Manner in which the Turks may again become formidable at some future period—Revival of the ancient orders of chivalry for the protection of the European confederacy—Re-

Reflections on the proposed plan of operations—Moral and political considerations on war.

MOUNT HÆMUS, called by the Turks the *Balkan*, (the common appellation for every mountain), extends its base to within about forty miles of the Danube ; but is not so considerable as has been generally represented. At a distance, it is not unlike the Donnersberg in the Vosges, and also resembles this mountain in regard to soil, the nature of its wood and pasturage, and the extent of its plateau. The roads across it are more difficult, which circumstance may be attributed to the country being more thinly inhabited and less cultivated ; though, to judge from the maps of this part of the world, (so little can they be depended on), and from the descriptions given by travellers, we might be induced at least to presume the existence of villages and cultivated vallies, which would tend to facilitate its communications. The ordinary road taken by couriers and travellers to Constantinople passes through Shumla*, which may be considered the gate of the Balkan, or the Thermopylæ of the Turks. In all recent wars, it is here where the Vizier

* See the Map.

fixed his camp, and the Russians have never been able to penetrate beyond it, when marching upon Constantinople. Hence this point has obtained a kind of strategical importance, which indeed it also deserves from its forming the junction of the roads leading from Rutschuk, Silistria, and Ismael, on the Danube; and from Varna and other places on the Black Sea; as also from Tirnova, through Osmanbasar, and from other principal vallies of Bulgaria; and which separate again into several roads on the opposite side of the mountain. The situation of Shumla is also favorable for defence*. It is a considerable town, containing thirty thousand inhabitants, and is encompassed by a counterfort of the Balkan, in the form of a horse-shoe, the steep declivities of which are covered with thorn-bushes, which afford an advantageous nestling to the well armed Turk, who gladly avails himself of the protection secured by elevations of ground and entrenchments. The whole place, which is about two miles in length, and one in breadth, is surrounded by an earthen rampart, or by a thick brick wall, flanked by small massive watch-towers, each capable of containing five or six fu-

* See the Plan!

sileers. Such is the nucleus of the intrenched camp, the contour of which is naturally indicated by the surrounding heights. The great circumference of the camp, the vallies by which it is intersected, and the before-mentioned declivities, are equally obstacles to an investment and to an attack. The place is perfectly secure from a bombardment, and contains sufficient space for all the supplies of the army. It even comprises within the circuit of the trenches, vineyards and gardens, and that greatest requisite of the camp, a stream of clear water, which branches out in different directions.

The distance from Shumla to Constantinople is about two hundred miles. The principal road winds along a valley to Pravodi, also a considerable town, where it first ascends the Balkan; upon which the town of Aidos, remarkable for its warm springs, forms the first station, at a distance of about three marches from Shumla. About two marches farther on, lies the town of Faki in Roumelia, beyond the Balkan, where the country becomes cultivated, assumes a milder aspect, and offers greater facility of intercourse. The road soon joins the one leading from Adrianople to Constantinople, and the caravans which travel between these two cities, performing the journey in five or

six days, already give evidence of internal communications, and of all the advantages which military operations must derive from the existence of commercial intercourse.

Should a Russian army design to carry on, with vigor, a war of invasion into the heart of the Ottoman empire, there is no doubt that it would choose this road as its line of operations. It is obvious, however, that it would be previously necessary to beat, or turn by manœuvring, the Turkish army which we must always expect to find posted at Shumla. The Russian General Kaminsky failed in both attempts in the campaign of 1810. The latter, however, would certainly be attended with much greater chance of success, if, while the main army menaced the Turks in front, and took advantage of every favorable opportunity for attack or annoyance, another corps were to cross the Danube at Nicopoli or Rutschuk, and march, by Tirnowa, directly upon Adrianople. Upon this road, across the Balkan, which, though actually existing, is very rarely used, all that the army would have to encounter would be natural obstacles, which, with the assistance of some hundreds of pioneers attached the advanced guard might be easily overcome. Perhaps it would be necessary, in the mountain-

passes, to take asunder the pieces of artillery, and to place them on the cars which are met with in Wallachia, and which are easily made to pass any where. Should there be a Turkish garrison in Tirnova, which is most likely, it would be necessary to take possession of this town, and convert it into a magazine. The soldier would carry with him his provisions for the three or four marches which it takes to cross the Balkan; as also the cavalry their forage. A moderate supply in reserve of ammunition and other requisites might be transported in carts, and upon beasts of burden, for which the green forage in the vicinity of the road might suffice. Besides, in the more cultivated parts, where the rearing of cattle is attended to, deficiencies might be supplied from the numerous haystacks which are to be found in the fields and vallies. It is the season of the year which is more particularly to be considered. Until the commencement of the very hot weather, the grass grows almost to the height of a man; and the hay-harvest is earlier than in more northern climates: but, in the middle of summer, a drought takes place; the ground is, as it were, singed; not a blade of grass is to be seen; and the rivulets and vallies are completely dried up. These remarks

which we have partly made already in regard to Wallachia, the valley of the Danube, and Bulgaria, naturally apply with more force to the south side of the Balkan. Hence the spring* and the commencement of summer are the most convenient time for a vigorous campaign in this country.

In this way, before the very hot weather sets in, the Christian armies would be already in possession of the most important points, particularly the principal towns, from which the necessary supplies for the troops, whether they are in position, or on the march, could be furnished. Adrianople, which the corps d'armée operating by Tirnova must endeavour to surprise, is a large populous town, still protected by walls and towers, built by the Romans. These must be approached immediately upon the arrival of the troops, vigorously cannonaded until a breach is effected, and then stormed; for we may confidently calculate upon the Grand Vizier retiring in all haste with his army from Shumla, to the assistance of the besieged place, or even to cover Constantinople. Then must the army which is immediately op-

* About the month of April, for there is no pasturage to be found there before that time.

posed to him, pursue him closely and diligently, and endeavour to anticipate him in his retreat, by turning him with a detached corps. (That this is possible, is sufficiently proved by Kaminsky's campaign, when the Russians already occupied the road to Constantinople in the rear of the Turkish army at Shumla.) It is well known that in a retreat of this kind, the Turks never think of carrying off their supplies and camp-equipage, but that every one provides only for himself, as was the case in Syria, during Bonaparte's campaign. It is therefore highly probable that every thing would fall into the hands of the pursuing army, and procure for it a superabundance of provisions.

Above all, the corps in front of Adrianople must, immediately upon its arrival, even if it should not succeed in gaining prompt possession of the place, send a strong detachment upon the road to Faki, for the purpose of cutting off from the army at Shumla its principal communication and its supplies, and of encountering it when upon its retreat from the Balkan, to which it must soon be compelled. None but fugitives will have carried the alarm to Constantinople, of which advantage must be taken as soon as possible. The main army which pushes forward along the high road by Shumla,

tions, bringing the country under subjection, and making every necessary preparation for a vigorous and resolute movement. Great facility will be given to the attainment of all these objects, by having, upon each line of operation, a detachment, which, following a few marches in the rear, escorts the necessary reserves of ammunition, serves as an available column along the road, leaves garrisons where they are required, and, upon its final junction with the army, fulfils, in every respect, the service for which it was intended. In this case, only a few days' halt would be necessary, preparatory to the taking up of a new line, in which the fleet might perhaps possess itself of the port of Mudia, and the whole army become concentrated at Araba-Burgas, whence the advance upon Constantinople ought to be made without delay.

It is absolutely necessary that a division of reserve should be stationed at Adrianople, and be maintained as strong as possible by the arrival of reinforcements and stragglers. Hence, through a fatal course of events, this place, which was the head-quarters of the victorious sultans, where, for nearly a century, they enclosed the unfortunate Greek emperors in Constantinople, until they completed the ruin of

their empire, may also become that of the Christians; who, however, should their plans be well laid, and their means adequate, would not require more days than the Turks did years, for the conquest of the country. It will be the duty of the reserve division to organize the country in rear of the army, and to occupy with detachments the towns of Philippopolis, Lofscha, Sophia, &c. either by force of arms or pacific negotiations, in both of which the most valuable assistance might be expected from the numerous Greek population in these places, and from the co-operation of the Servians.

With regard to the force necessary to be employed in a similar invasion, I am of opinion that less importance is to be attached to the numerical strength of the army destined to enter the campaign, than to the keeping it constantly in a complete state. The maximum of fifty thousand men in open field of battle, fixed by Montecuculi, as already mentioned, ought to suffice at the present day, the more especially as the Turks no longer bring such large armies into the field as they used to do; and the modern organization of European troops, of which a well-instructed infantry con-

stitutes the principal force, renders the contrast still more favorable for the Christians.

In order that the principal army may, upon the day of battle, have its 50,000 men assembled at one point, we must add to this number 30,000 more, for the detached corps upon the coast, and the reserve division, which makes altogether 80,000 men.

The corps operating upon Adrianople ought to amount to 30,000 men, besides a division as an advanced guard, and another as a reserve : altogether about 60,000 men ; whence the total force to be employed in crossing the Balkan would be 140,000 men.

In order, however, to secure the rear, and to observe, and gradually capture, those places on the Danube, of which the Turks may still be in possession, 60,000 men more will be required, which, as soon as these places are taken, will follow as an army of reserve, and firmly establish, and even restore, should it at any time be lost, the communication with the main army operating in front. With these 200,000 men, whose number must be recompleted before the end of the campaign, there can be no doubt that an active general, superior to the prejudices of former times, will accomplish the con-

quest of Turkey in Europe, if not in the first, certainly in the second campaign.

- The most striking of these prejudices is the extreme solicitude for the preservation of the communications. Count Kaminsky, in his campaign of 1810, might have had some grounds for his unwillingness to leave in his rear the Turkish fortresses on the Danube, Silistria, Rutschuk, Giurgevo, Nicopoli, &c. with their mostly strong garrisons. He had not sufficient force to enable him to leave an army in his rear capable of paralysing them, and of protecting Wallachia against any irruption they might be induced to make. But the general who crosses the Balkan in the way we have indicated, having his rear fully secured by a blockading army of reserve, must not be uneasy should his line of communication be momentarily interrupted by hordes of freebooters and the like. When once across the mountains, he should reflect on Hannibal in Italy.

If we recall to mind the events of the war at the end of the last century, in which Russia and Austria were allied against Turkey, and compare them with those of earlier wars upon this theatre, we shall be forced to admit that the Ottoman empire was never nearer to its destruction than in the campaign of 1789, after

the victory gained by the Prince of Coburg and Suwarow, and the capture of Belgrade by a separate army under Laudon. There was still sufficient time for an autumn campaign, and nothing to prevent the conquerors of Wallachia from marching upon Shumla; whilst the Austrians, under Laudon, might have advanced upon Constantinople by Nissa and Sophia. This road, which lay open to them, has always been used by the couriers, and we find it mentioned in old descriptions, for instance, in Veterani's Campaigns, as being not only practicable for carriages, but also accompanied by good collateral roads, all of which pass through a cultivated country, of which Büsching, in his Geography, makes particular mention^b.

From Sophia we easily reach Philippopolis. The Austrians, in 1688, after having gained, under the Prince of Baden, a battle at Nissa, and for a long time occupied this place, advanced thither with a detached corps, passing

^b For instance, in his description of Bulgaria: "At the foot of Mount Witoscha, which lies some miles beyond Sophia, towards the borders of Roumelia, are to be found several villages, corn-fields, meadows, and vineyards, besides warm-baths of great repute in that country, as also iron mines." He frequently speaks of monasteries, and of the riches of the country in corn, wine, and pasturage.

by Sophia on their way, and carried off the Cadi, with several of the principal Turkish inhabitants, as their prisoners. Alarm was immediately spread through the whole of Macedonia and Roumelia. At Adrianople, and even in their capital, the Turks considered themselves no longer secure, and were flying with their treasures into Asia. Montecuculi, who points out better than any one the roads by which the Turks should be attacked, also proposes this line of operations.

This road by Nissa, Sophia, and Philippopolis, which only crosses branches of the Balkan, and leaves the principal chain on the left, is much less difficult than the before-mentioned one by Tirnova to Adrianople. The ancient town of Philippopolis, with its numerous Greek population, would probably prove an easy conquest, and it would certainly furnish subsistence to the army for the rest of the way, since it carries on an important trade, particularly in rice, which grows in the vicinity; and the river Marissa, which is here navigable, and flows towards Adrianople, offers great facility for the conveyance of supplies. In general, this part of the country presents a wide cultivated valley as far as Adrianople, in which the road proceeds along the Marissa, and where troops can

pass with ease, remain at rest, or even be actively employed, during winter; the climate being here considerably milder than on the north side of the Balkan.

If, in 1810, the Russian army, under Count Kaminsky, was really as strong as the public accounts represented it to be, namely, considerably above 100,000 men, it might certainly have executed this operation, along both lines, upon the capital. We have seen that Czerny-George was already upon the road to Nissa. The Russian corps which came to support him only required therefore to be reinforced, in order to act upon the offensive against the Turks along this line. A battle gained would then have brought the Russians before Adrianople. The Servians would have secured the communication with the rear, and it was only necessary to keep in view the junction with the main army advancing from Shumla. We must, however, recall to mind that the Russian force at that period was much less than the supposed number, and that the political posture of affairs did not admit of a similar expedition. Russia could not allow her armies to remain at such a distance, and for such a length of time, from Christian Europe, which was threatened with a more important war; and as

it was the object of France to keep her occupied with the Turkish war, so was it also her interest speedily to terminate it, by limiting her conquests to that of Moldavia and Wallachia. The annihilation of the Turkish empire in Europe was certainly not the object in view.

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The road which leads directly to the heart of the empire, is always the shortest and the best; whence the one to Constantinople ought to be preferred to a more circuitous one, even though the latter should seem to lead with a greater degree of certainty to the conquest of the Ottomans. At the same time the idea naturally presents itself, that previously to the attack upon Constantinople, a landing should be effected in Asia Minor; a measure strictly conformable to military principles, since it would prevent the escape of the Grand Seignor into that country with his treasures, which ought to serve as an indemnity for the expences of the war°. When, therefore, the army ad-

° Although well-informed travellers assert that the extent of these treasures is a mere fable, still the well-attested extraordinary wealth of the greater part of the Pachas and other Satraps of the Turkish empire, lead us to conclude, with good reason, that the riches of the Sultan must be in a far greater

vances upon the capital by Adrianople, the flotilla, which has co-operated in a parallel direction along the coast, will pass over to the Asiatic side, and disembark troops wherever it may be found practicable; and the first occupation of these will be to secure the landing-place by suitable entrenchments^a. A sufficient number of ships of war, equipped in the ports of the Black Sea, must of course make good the entrance into the Bosphorus; and protect the landing. Though the defence of the coasts is represented as being badly organized by the Turks, still the outlet from the Black Sea is said to be the best defended. But the most recent descriptions only mention the two old castles, Rumili-Hissar, and Anadoli-Hissar, constructed under Mahomet II. the one upon the European, and the other upon the Asiatic coast. These castles could not inflict much injury upon the ships of war, and might easily be silenced by the superior fire of the latter; and

proportion. He is the heir to all these grandees, who are only to consider the property they actually possess, as a loan during life.

^a This landing-place might probably be the promontory on which the light-house is situated, immediately upon the entrance into the Bosphorus.

all the coast-batteries would soon be turned by the troops, after a sufficient number had been landed.

The above-mentioned castles, which are situated nearly five miles distant from the entrance into the Bosphorus, and where it is narrowest, would be unable to hold out against a well-directed attack from the land side; and then every attempt of the Turks to effect a passage across the Bosphorus, already rendered difficult by the ships of war, would be completely frustrated*.

But a most important object will be to take possession of Scutari, a large and magnificent suburb, if it may be so called, of Constantinople, situated on the Asiatic coast, immediately opposite the Seraglio, built in the form of an amphitheatre, surrounded by heights, the approach to which is open, running out into a narrow point, completely commanded the moment it is invested, unprovided with walls, and, from its vast extent, not easily encompassed with a solid rampart, it would present

* This co-operation of the vessels, and the landing itself, would be facilitated by the north wind, which generally prevails in the Bosphorus, and by the current, which flows from the Black Sea into that of Marmara.

an easy conquest, notwithstanding its seventy thousand inhabitants, of whom the greater part are true believers. The Russian flag would soon be seen waving over the towers or the ruins of Scutari, and Constantinople would tremble^f.

Whilst this footing is being made on the coast, Cossacks and light infantry would be sent to the nearest favorable position, from whence they might discover whether any Asiatic troops were approaching to succour the capital.

In the meantime Constantinople will be hard pressed upon the European side. The army should be established as near to it as possible, and should cut off the conduits which convey spring water to the inhabitants from reservoirs situated some miles distant. We know, from experience, that nothing will reduce the Turks more easily than thirst^g. Hence a close blockade will suffice to force the town to surrender,

^f *Prague est à moi, et Varsovie tremble!* was Suwarrow's laconic and nervous expression in his despatch.

^g We have already alluded (in page 47) to the Turkish national and religious custom of establishing wells and reservoirs of fresh spring water. "*Water gives life to every thing,*" is a sentence of the Koran, which is inscribed upon the principal fountains.

without the necessity of a formal attack, and its consequent sacrifice of life.

It will be necessary to have the posts chosen for the close investment of the place strongly fortified, as also the neighbouring villages and other advantageous points upon the roads leading to the town; and the troops which defend these posts should be supported by others encamped in their rear; by which means the sorties of the infuriated Mussulmans will be effectually checked, and a part of the besieging army encamped still further to the rear as a last reserve, be enabled to enjoy perfect tranquillity.

The plans of Constantinople show that its localities favor these dispositions. We observe on the land side numerous large and small suburbs commencing from the wall, farms and villages within cannon-shot, and the more elevated ground intersected by marshy hollows, which extend to the town, and thus form narrow approaches. On the other side of the port, the quarter of the town called Gallata lies immediately behind the extensive suburb of Pera, which is at present quite open; but even if it were fortified after the Turkish fashion, it could oppose no great resistance.

In conformity with the principles of a situa-

ble defence, as regards the exterior of the town, the besieged would also take advantage of these localities. The suburb of Ejub, extending along the port, with its adjacent marshy hollows, narrow ridges, detached villages and farms, presents a favorable position for an entrenched camp, of which the elevated village of Topdschikerkoi forms the key. In front is the extensive plain of Daudpacha, upon which the Sultan reviews the troops which are destined to take the field in Europe. This, being the only plain in the vicinity, would probably become the rendezvous of the Spahis, whose great numbers could not prove otherwise than burdensome if confined within the walls. A few favorable points fortified in advance of the above camp, would secure for this cavalry free passages for its sorties, and protection for its retreat. I do not fear, in writing this, that I am committing an act of treachery to the cause of Christianity, since, without taking into account that the Turks are no great readers, they would, even should some good advice reach their knowledge, follow it so badly as to afford much greater advantage to the besiegers than to themselves. If, for instance, the former be prepared to make an immediate assault, when the Spahis are driven back, in the usual way,

into their entrenched camp, the height of Ejub, the declivity of which falls towards the town and the harbour, may become a second Montmartre, which will secure the possession of the populous suburb without much sacrifice of life. But in either case, whether this height be disputed or abandoned by the Turks, we ought, the moment possession is taken of it, to construct upon it the works necessary for the closer blockade of the place, and vigorously attack, under cover of an efficient fire of artillery, such outworks as the besieged may have raised between it and the walls.

But before we reduce the capital of the Mussulmans to extremities, let us take a glance at the operations in Asia Minor, that we may judge what measures may be requisite for preventing any interruption of the siege from that quarter.

If the campaign have been conducted as rapidly and vigorously as we have premised, the army will have arrived in front of Constantinople without having suffered much loss, and previously to the termination of the favorable season: and if we take into our calculation the supposed reserve of supplies and reinforcements of all kinds, there will be sufficient force not only to carry on the blockade in the man-

ner pointed out, but also, by means of continual disembarkations, to augment the army of observation in Asia Minor to the number of 50,000 men. The latter will then advance as far as the river Sakaria, about three marches distant, and detach at the same time a corps to the right, to drive back the Turks towards Mount Olympus, but which, however, must not proceed beyond Isnik. All further advance on this side can only be made by scouting parties and patrols, since Bursa, a considerable town situated at the foot of Olympus, and mostly inhabited by Turks, would probably offer resistance, and prevent any footing being made within its immediate territories. It will, however, be necessary to take possession of it, with a view to the enjoyment of undisturbed winter-quarters; but it will answer better to defer this expedition to the autumn, when, if the fate of the capital be decided, it can be attacked in form with sufficient force. All the smaller places in the extent of country thus occupied by the army in Asia Minor, and which is protected by natural obstacles, will be taken possession of in one way or another; (for instance, Ismid, the harbour of which may prove useful); and, after all the Turks have been carried off as prisoners, it will be right to intro-

duce among the Jews, Greeks, and Armenians, a sort of regular government, under the protection of small garrisons, secured, where necessary, by entrenchments or other fortifications.

In the meantime Constantinople will be reduced to the utmost necessity. The people will be fighting among themselves at the fountains for spring-water, should these not have all been dried up in the manner we have before pointed out; the magazines will soon become exhausted, the Janissaries reduced to horse-flesh, and all who are not true Turks will be condemned to starve, if not already sacrificed to the fury of the Mussulmans. Both humanity and the success of the enterprise, however, require that matters should not be brought to this extremity, but that we should rather offer to the Ottomans a free retreat with their families and property, which they will no doubt gladly accept. We need only stipulate that all public property, and such as belongs to the Sultan, should be surrendered, or ransomed by a contribution levied exclusively upon Turks. Such an arrangement ought to satisfy both parties, and more particularly the victor, since he could employ the time occupied by the retreat of the inhabitants, which might last for weeks and even months, in extending his conquests in

Asia Minor. At least a half of the army might be transported across the Bosphorus, and form an encampment at Scutari, whilst a corps d'armée, provided with adequate means, might be detached on the before-mentioned expedition to Bursa. But in order to prevent the siege of this town from being disturbed by the Turks who have evacuated Constantinople, it must be stipulated in the convention, that they shall retire to a place named by the Christian general, and that they shall be supplied with rations on the road, an arrangement which can be conducted by parties of Cossacks, in conjunction with the Turkish authorities. We should propose to the Sultan, or Grand Vizier, the town of Eski-Schéher (the ancient Dorylaeum) as a temporary residence; the road to which leads through Ismid (Nicomedia), and along the river Sakaria. It is situated on the river Prusak (or Purzack), which flows from Mount Emir. At the distance of some days' journey higher up this river lies Kutayah, the capital of Anatolia, the residence of the Pacha. This river Prusak, the Tymbris of the ancients, might become the provisional boundary of the Ottoman empire, to be forced still further back upon a future convenient occasion. We will content ourselves with terminating this cam-

paign by the capture of Bursa and the defiles of Mount Olympus.

It will certainly be advisable, at all events, to drive the Turks further back, in order to enjoy tranquil possession of Constantinople. The example of Bosniak-Aga at Rutschuk proves sufficiently how the Turks are ready to re-appear before the places they have lost, the moment they entertain a hope of recovering them. We must therefore always be prepared for their return, and establish ourselves firmly by means of military force, in all the conquered towns and districts. So long as the standard of Mahomet shall wave upon the Prusak, it will draw towards it swarms of the faithful from the interior of Asia, and no Christian settlement will flourish in Asia Minor. But as it will be necessary to occupy a certain extent of territory, to cover the Bosphorus, another campaign will be required. If Russia is to undertake it *alone*, the Anatolian coast of the Black sea presents itself as the natural base. It appears to me that the Sakaria river must be forced, where its course is in a northerly direction, somewhere along the road to Khandek, and that we must establish ourselves at this point, and higher up the stream, where its course runs from east to west. At the same

time, a disembarkation must be effected in the ancient port of Heraclea (Erakli), or at any more convenient place, for an advance upon Boli; when, if a line of communication be thus in some measure secured, the Sakaria can be crossed again, and an attack made upon the rear of the Turks posted along the Prusak; a manoeuvre not unlike that of Buonaparte in the campaign of Marengo, supposing the Sakaria to be the Po. At all events, we must endeavour to find the Turkish army, and, by gaining a battle, drive it beyond the mountains of Olympus and Emir; while another corps will divert it in front upon the Prusak, cover the conquered territory, and then occupy, or besiege, the towns of Eski-Scheher and Kutaya. The consequence of such a victory would be the subjugation of the whole of ancient Bithynia, how the northern part of Anatolia, between the coast and the mountains, and of which Angora, famous for its trade, is the capital. The Sublime Porte would then be obliged to fix its residence in Kara-Hissar on the Meinder, or in Konia, (or Cogni, the ancient Iconium) where the Turkish emperors formerly held their warlike court, before they became established in Europe.

Upon the supposition that other European

powers were to co-operate in this war against the Turks, the conquest of Asia Minor would become a much easier matter, after the capture of Constantinople. An army coming from the west would land at Smyrna, and make this place the base of its ulterior operations. The caravans make the journey from Smyrna to Karahissar in seven days, so that an army will reach the latter place without difficulty; and as it only takes seven more days for a similar journey to Angora, which was to be occupied by the Russians, a junction might easily be formed by the two Christian armies along this road, with a view to force back the Turks upon Mount Taurus, whence they originally came.⁽¹⁾ In furtherance, however, of this undertaking, we must, above all, take possession of the countries along the coast, and these would offer the easiest conquest. They are ill suited to the Turks, who, in accordance with their original national character and disposition, and with the law of their first Caliph Omar, are bad sailors^b. So important a diversion in favor

^a As Lycurgus interdicted navigation to the Spartans, so did the first Caliph prohibit it among the Turks. His fourth successor, however, Moavia, prudently set aside this law, and raised a fleet in the Mediterranean, with which he besieged

of Greece, would enable her to free herself, without further assistance, from the yoke under which she now suffers, and the Christian powers would have only to concert measures respecting her future state, and that of Egypt and Syria. But if it were possible to revive the ancient crusades in a purer spirit, it were to be wished that an alliance might be formed for so sacred an object as that of annihilating the piratical states of northern Africa, which still carry on their infamous rapacities and cruelties, to the shame and reproach of the age in which we live. This, however, lies far beyond *our* military sphere; but it would be well suited for France and Spain, who might find in it the means of ridding themselves of those turbulent spirits, by which their interior is so constantly agitated¹.

Constantinople, though without effect, but took possession of the island of Rhodes on his return. It was not until 800 years afterwards, that Constantinople was captured, by the Turks, under Mahomet II.

¹ Buonaparte, at the time of his consulship, and after the peace of Amiens, actually conceived this philanthropic idea, and thus expressed himself to a great military character and statesman: "Posterity shall not say that a man of distinction (*un homme marquant*) stood at the head of the French government, and tolerated the revolting barbarities of these pi-

If the Mussulmans, after having been driven back to the banks of the Euphrates and of the Tigris, and into the great peninsula of Arabia, their original native country, were again to become what they formerly were, wandering shepherds and huntsmen; if they were to renounce the enervating enjoyments to which their indolence has given birth^k; and if, at the same time, they were to become reconciled

rates." Had he thus applied the resources of revolutionized France, which only required to be brought into activity, instead of offering violence to Europe, what an imperishable crown he would have gained! Spain was his ally, and both circumstances and means were infinitely more favorable for him than for Charles V. who failed in a similar attempt. Unfortunately, this undertaking did not occupy a conspicuous place in the order of his projects.

^k The constant habit of drinking coffee and smoking tobacco evidently produces these effects among them. It is remarkable that both enjoyments are forbidden by the Koran, equally with wine, and that the Turks still rigidly abstained from them under Murad IV. (1635). The use of opium is one of their more modern transgressions, but is not so general, nor so influential upon their combats as it is said to be. Their opium-eaters can scarcely be compared with our professed drinkers, their means of intoxication being an infinitely greater article of luxury than our favorite spirits. A comparison of the progressive change in their manners and customs, with the different epocha of their history, affords ample scope for reflection.

with their neighbours, the Persians, upon certain doctrines and customs, which had their origin in a schism among the followers of Mahomet¹; and, in accordance with the change of the people, their sovereign were to occupy no longer the seraglio, but the camp, then indeed might Europe beware of another Bajazet.

The great improvements which have been effected in our military system certainly leave us little reason to dread a repetition of what was experienced by the Christian powers of former times. But it will be absolutely necessary that the colonies which may be founded in the conquered territories should not lay by their arms, but that they should be maintained by the contingents which the mother countries will be obliged to furnish during several generations, for the general security of Europe. In that part of the world, it might also prove a salutary measure to revive the ancient orders

For instance, among other differences, the green and yellow slippers; the former of which the Persians are in the habit of wearing; whereas the Turks consider green a sacred color, and do not suffer it to appear on their feet. They adorn theirs mostly with a yellow covering, and only allow green turbans to the real descendants from the Prophet, who wear them as a peculiar mark of distinction.

of chivalry, constituted and organized conformably with the spirit of the age. The conquered country, which the component parts of its military state would intimately connect with the European powers, far from becoming an apple of discord, would rather prove the means of establishing among them new ties of amity. The superfluity of the population of Europe would there find convenient settlements, and its youth, with highly excited ardor, would also repair thither to seek an opportunity of gaining spurs. This practical military school, situated at the extremity of the civilized continent would be productive of general advantage, and Christian nations would no longer conceive themselves obliged to make war upon one another from time to time, in order to maintain among them a true military spirit.

* * * * *

The plan of operations which has been here laid down is no chimerical and impracticable scheme. The idea of a military state, such as I have proposed, is not so entirely at variance with European notions of state policy, as might be imagined. We find a similar establishment in the military frontier of Austria^m, as also in

^m This consists of those parts of Croatia, Sclavonia, Upper Hungary, and Transylvania, which border on Turkey.

the military colonies lately introduced in the south of Russia; and there would be at least nothing unnatural in the union of similar institutions with an order of chivalry, emanating from the war, and founded for the protection of the confederated states of Christian Europe. When the Emperor Paul conceived the transient idea of uniting the grand mastership of the order of Malta, with his crown, perhaps he only wanted the opportunity for making war upon the Turks, to carry a somewhat similar design into execution.

But, it will probably be remarked, a war with the Turks lies so completely out of the sphere of most of the European armies, that though a dissertation on the subject may tend to satisfy curiosity, it ought not to occupy a place in a treatise on the art of war. It should, however, be borne in mind that little more than a century has elapsed since troops from Brandenburg and other parts of Germany shared in the victories of Prince Louis of Baden and of Prince Eugene of Savoy: and who is there that can answer for the march of future

Here every member of a family, capable of bearing arms is a soldier, for which service a grant of land is given to the father in lieu of pay.

events? The idea that the only object for which the soldier has been raised and formed is the mere defence of his native soil, ought not to be tolerated in any army. It is only when the actual existence of a nation is at stake, that its combined strength is to be considered in this point of view. An army which is imbued with high notions of honor, will be at all times prepared to fight under whatever zone the will of its sovereign may send it, and will rejoice in the opportunity afforded it of adding to its military renown without incurring the devastation of its native country. When a war breaks out, the soldier does not separate the interest of the state from that of his sovereign, nor does he reason upon its justice, which it more properly belongs to those in power to reconcile with their consciences. Nothing really great would have happened; no durable monument would have remained to signalize the history of a people, if every action had been submitted to the previous decision of a court of justice, agreeably to the laws by which civil life is regulated^a.

^a History furnishes us with numerous instances in which posterity judges very differently from cotemporaries. The war undertaken by Louis XIV. for the Spanish succession,

So long as Christian nations are governed by sovereigns who reciprocally respect their rights, their wars may be compared, in regard

was considered, at the time, an evident injustice, and yet fifty years had scarcely elapsed, when Frederick II, wrote to Voltaire (Oeuvres posthumes, Tome ix.) "that it would have been an act of cowardice on the part of Louis XIV. not to have accepted the will and testament of the King of Spain." The same might perhaps be said with regard to the war of 1740. As to the war of the French revolution, even admitting that the allies were the aggressors, it must be allowed that its last results have entirely confounded those philanthropic ideas, so much in vogue at its commencement, that it was one which ought to have been avoided, as being contrary to the interests of several states. At that time began the reign of the new philosophers of France, who advocated universal peace, and who stigmatized the soldier as a mercenary executioner; and experience has pointed out to us the advantages which mankind are likely to derive from such a government. They imagined too, that the tranquillity and happiness of nations would be secured by granting them institutions which would render it impossible to carry on any other than defensive, or what are called national wars. To them we may attribute the proposed suppression of standing armies; a measure which would involve in inevitable ruin, the peaceable, wealthy, and contented nations, who having lost their warlike habit, could no longer resist the efforts of those who have no reason to remain so quietly disposed; and it is an old remark, that a people has always proved itself most formidable to its neighbors when its military spirit has been engendered by civil war.

to their object and the manner of conducting them, to those duels, which, though they cannot be justified either in a philosophical or a moral point of view, yet, when submitted to the laws of honor, were well suited in their times to preserve society from still greater evils. As in the mutual relations of civil life, such as it has continued to exist from the beginning of the world, it is found impossible for the virtue of the sage to prevail, so is it contrary to the law of nature, for nations of opposite views and interests to conform to one just and invariable standard. Hence we may be assured, and the experience of all ages proves it, that the idea of a perpetual peace belongs only to those pleasing dreams which man is not destined to see realized. If the peace we now enjoy be preserved during the present generation, those nations who require repose, may be thankful for its blessings; but, if the course of events shall call us again into the field, let us at least endeavor to carry on the war in a truly Christian and honorable spirit. Let all national animosity be set aside. Whatever may have formerly been the cause of our mutual reproaches, they are now tolerably adjusted by the vicissitudes of fortune. We should always recollect, whether our foes be

Christians or Mussulmans, that it is not against those who have individually injured or insulted us, that we are called upon to fight, but against the common enemies of our king and country.

THE END.

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